There has been a lot of discussion about the ethical nuances of withdrawal of life support and provision of medications that relieve suffering but accelerate death, but precious little about an important aspect of end of life care that comes up all the time - what are our obligations regarding provision of oxygen to dying patients?
The withdrawal of life support is an activity (a commission) that is ethically protected because patients' autonomy and right to refuse treatments overrides the harm (death) that comes about when physicians act to withdraw life support. This in itself is interesting because most states prohibit euthanasia (or the provision of prescriptions that enable patients to take their own lives), which is in essence a commission (as opposed to an omission) that accelerates death. I'm struggling to understand the distinction, except that the withdrawal of life support restores the patient to a "natural state" and allows nature to take its course, whereas the provision of a prescription to allow a patient to overdose is a commission that seems to interfere with nature. (Jonathan Baron has written extensively about our preference for "natural states" which often leads to worse outcomes.) That takes care of the natural versus human distinction (which of course ignores that humans are part of nature), but I still struggle to understand why the patient in Oregon has to administer his own overdose, unassisted by a healthcare professional - what's the difference between a healthcare professional assisting with the administration of an overdose and accelerating death, and his removing life support and thus accelerating death, if both acts are in deference to patient autonomy, and both are commissions, and indeed both are direct actions, as opposed to indirect ones? Maybe it's because you can act directly and cause harm in respect of autonomy as long as you restore a natural state (withdrawal of life support), but you cannot act directly to cause harm in respect of autonomy by causing an unnatural state (medication overdose). I think this stream of consciousness has led me to the distinction. Maybe. The devil is in the details.
The withdrawal of life support is an activity (a commission) that is ethically protected because patients' autonomy and right to refuse treatments overrides the harm (death) that comes about when physicians act to withdraw life support. This in itself is interesting because most states prohibit euthanasia (or the provision of prescriptions that enable patients to take their own lives), which is in essence a commission (as opposed to an omission) that accelerates death. I'm struggling to understand the distinction, except that the withdrawal of life support restores the patient to a "natural state" and allows nature to take its course, whereas the provision of a prescription to allow a patient to overdose is a commission that seems to interfere with nature. (Jonathan Baron has written extensively about our preference for "natural states" which often leads to worse outcomes.) That takes care of the natural versus human distinction (which of course ignores that humans are part of nature), but I still struggle to understand why the patient in Oregon has to administer his own overdose, unassisted by a healthcare professional - what's the difference between a healthcare professional assisting with the administration of an overdose and accelerating death, and his removing life support and thus accelerating death, if both acts are in deference to patient autonomy, and both are commissions, and indeed both are direct actions, as opposed to indirect ones? Maybe it's because you can act directly and cause harm in respect of autonomy as long as you restore a natural state (withdrawal of life support), but you cannot act directly to cause harm in respect of autonomy by causing an unnatural state (medication overdose). I think this stream of consciousness has led me to the distinction. Maybe. The devil is in the details.